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SUBSTANTIVE HABEAS
KIMBERLY A. THOMAS*
Substantive Habeas identifies the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent shift in its
habeas jurisprudence from procedure to the substance of habeas review and
explores the implications of this change.
For decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to control the flood of
habeas corpus petitions by imposing procedural requirements on prisoners
seeking to challenge constitutional error in their cases. These restrictive procedural
rules have remained at the center of habeas decision making until recently.
Over the past few years, instead of further constraining the procedural
gateway for habeas cases, the Supreme Court has shifted its focus to the
substance of habeas. The result is a narrowing of the substantive window
through which habeas petitioners must pass. This important shift to restrictive
substantive habeas has not been explored in the scholarly literature and is
changing the terms of habeas litigation.
This nascent move is not without ripple effects. To flesh out possible
implications, Substantive Habeas posits a hypothetical habeas case that,
under the Court’s current restrictive substantive habeas law, turns procedural
doctrine on its head and creates perverse incentives for state prisoners. What is
missing from the Court’s move to substantive habeas is a clear explanation of
how the substantive and the procedural aspects of habeas fit together. Taking
as a given that the Court has narrowed the procedural door to habeas relief,
largely in the name of comity and federalism, Substantive Habeas suggests a
complementary explanation for substantive habeas grounded in institutional
capacity and expertise.

* Clinical Professor, University of Michigan Law School. I am indebted to my
colleagues, especially David Moran and Paul Reingold, for helpful comments on
earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Shira Gordon, Shannon Leitner, and Chris
Schilling for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In habeas corpus, the terms of debate are shifting. For the past few
decades, the U.S. Supreme Court’s habeas jurisprudence for state
inmates has largely focused on process. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
Court imposed new procedural requirements on inmates that
narrowed the federal courthouse door to review of the merits of
inmates’ claims. These procedural rules were expanded with the
passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”),1 codified at 18 U.S.C. 2554, which significantly altered
the rules for habeas corpus. Despite the fact that the most prominent
section of AEDPA related to the substantive standard of review, and
not procedure, habeas litigation continued to have an intense focus
on process. Federal habeas cases brought by state prisoners have
involved fights about who can have their habeas claims heard and the
procedural barriers to federal court consideration, such as statutes of
limitations and procedural defaults. This procedural story was told
frequently both before and after the passage of AEDPA.2 This
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2012)).
2. While AEDPA significantly revised habeas corpus law for all prisoners, the
revisions were largely aimed at streamlining habeas corpus review in death penalty
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procedural focus has been well documented, has been the subject of
concern and commentary, and has largely defined much of the
habeas law. The effect of this focus has been to limit the potential for
state inmates to obtain habeas corpus relief through procedural bars
that keep the federal courts from hearing the substance of their claims.
There is a change in the wind. Over the past few years, the
Supreme Court has refocused habeas on the meaning and
interpretation of the substantive standard of review and related
substantive issues.3 In so doing, the Court has restricted the scope of
federal court review of state cases that raise questions of
constitutional law, largely by narrowly reading the language of
AEDPA’s substantive provisions.4 The Court has justified this move to
restrictive substantive habeas by invoking comity and federalism.5 At
the same time, the Court has not further closed—and perhaps has
slightly cracked open—some procedural avenues for state prisoners
filing habeas claims.6 In other words, habeas corpus law for state
prisoners is shifting from a focus on procedure to a focus on a
restrictive view of substantive habeas law.
This nascent move is not without ripple effects. To flesh out
possible implications, this Article posits a hypothetical habeas case in
which, under the Court’s current restrictive substantive habeas law, a
prisoner is arguably better off not following state procedural rules
than properly raising his constitutional claims for prompt review by
the state court.
This hypothetical, if true, turns procedural
doctrine—at least in a very limited circumstance—on its head and
creates perverse incentives for state prisoners. A move to a focus on
the substance of habeas could be consistent with the prior procedural
focus, but the Court’s current restrictive reading is not.
What is missing from the Court’s decisions is a clear examination
of how the substantive and the procedural aspects of habeas fit
together and a way to prioritize these aspects of habeas when there
might be a conflict between substantive and procedural doctrines.
Assuming that the Court has narrowed the procedural door to habeas
relief, largely in the name of comity and federalism, this Article finds
cases. See generally Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and
Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002)
(offering both a history and a harsh appraisal of death penalty habeas before and
after AEDPA).
3. See infra Part II (noting that the passage of the AEDPA set the stage for a move to
substantive habeas).
4. See infra Part II.C (chronicling the Court’s recent narrowing of substantive review).
5. See infra Part III.B (critiquing the Court’s comity and federalism narrative).
6. See infra Part II.C (observing the Court’s possible softening on its earlier procedural
habeas restrictions).
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a complementary explanation for habeas grounded in institutional
capacity and expertise. When substance and procedure run against
each other, we should look to these values to guide choices in a way
that is most consistent with pre-existing doctrines and the reality of
habeas practice. When trade-offs arise, institutional capacity and
expertise suggest that the federal courts should be allowed to
examine substantive questions of federal law, while leaving
interpretations of state procedural law to the state courts. For
example, federal court review of state procedural rules is state-law
dependent, and while rules exist to try to minimize the disruption to
state courts, a federal court’s interpretation of state law might
unsettle expectations in other state cases.7 On the other hand,
federal court review of state decisions on substantive federal law is
based on an area where the federal courts have greater expertise—
federal constitutional law—and only affect the case before the court.
Ultimately, if the values of institutional capacity and expertise tap
into our goals for habeas—which this Article asserts that they do—the
Court can sensibly uphold its prior procedural limits, but a move to
the most restrictive version of substantive habeas is misguided.
A few preliminary comments are necessary on the scope and focus
of this Article. This Article discusses the litigation brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court on questions of federal law raised by
state inmates.8 The “big” habeas story in terms of numbers and in
terms of precedential cases are the state cases. State prisoners file the
vast majority of habeas petitions.9 These state inmate cases invoke an

7. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264–65 (1989) (extending “to habeas review
the ‘plain statement’ rule for determining whether a state court has relied on an
adequate and independent state ground” and stating that “it would be more intrusive
for a federal court to second-guess a state court’s determination of state law”); see also
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1154–
55 (1986) (summarizing the relatively few available pre-AEDPA cases and noting that
state courts seem to feel obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s determination that its
state law was inadequate and reach the merits of federal claims in other similar cases).
8. Federal inmates can file habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
9. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1961 165 (1961) (noting
that in fiscal year 1961, state prisoners filed 906 habeas petitions in federal district
courts); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1960 116 (1960) (providing
statistics and reporting significant increases in the number of state habeas petitions
between the 1940s and 1960s as well as a significantly large number of state habeas
petitions compared to federal habeas petitions over the same period); Paul M. Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 506 (1963) (discussing the “ever increasing flood of habeas petitions from state
prisoners”); see also U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS 2010 30–31 (Mar 31, 2010)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CASELOAD STATISTICS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/table
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arguably more complex mix of issues, including the balance between
competing state and federal sovereigns.10 They have also garnered
criticism from some federal judges and state authorities.11 The
criticism has not waned over time, although the rate of habeas
petition filings by state inmates has, in fact, declined.12
This Article does not, throughout most of the piece, distinguish
state inmates who are serving prison sentences from those sentenced
to death. To the extent that different law applies to inmates
sentenced to death, the Article focuses on the cases in which a death
sentence is not imposed or, at least, the portion of death penalty
cases that does not implicate separate capital punishment law.13 This
choice is a pragmatic one. The habeas law developed by state
inmates under death sentences, except as it relates to the specifics of
capital punishment, applies to, and is used by, all state inmates in
federal court.14 Death penalty cases are, admittedly, different in
many respects.
One striking difference is the likelihood of
representation by an attorney—as opposed to pro se
representation15—as well as the likelihood of either the sentence or

s/B07Mar10.pdf (showing 965 habeas petitions from federal prisoners and 6,444
habeas petitions from state prisoners).
10. See, e.g., NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 108–21 (2011)
(outlining a different treatment for federal inmate cases than for state inmate cases
due to the differences between these types of cases, including the lack of need to
consider the question of separate sovereigns as well as the lack of previous postconviction review for federal inmates).
11. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Something for Everyone: Lawyers See Things to Like in
Habeas Review Decisions, 86 ABA J. 34, 34 (2000) (noting state prosecutor complaints
about federal judges reopening capital cases); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear
and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
699, 719 & nn.90, 92–93 (2002) (citing separate statements made by Justice Powell
and a circuit court judge that reflect judicial frustration with the volume of habeas
cases); see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1638
(2003) (pointing out a fifty percent increase in habeas petitions filed by state inmates
in federal court despite a less steep increase in the prisoner population).
12. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259,
286–87 (2006) (noting that the number of pending habeas petitions in federal courts
has declined since at least 2001).
13. But see Joseph L. Hoffmann, Substance and Procedure in Capital Cases: Why
Federal Habeas Corpus Should Review the Merits of Every Death Sentence, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1771, 1771 (2000) (“At least in our time, any meaningful discussion about habeas
must take account of the relationship between habeas and the death penalty.”).
14. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS 62 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants
/219559.pdf (explaining that capital habeas cases and non-capital habeas cases are
governed by the same statutory provisions).
15. Id. (“The single most important difference is that all but 7% of death row
filers have counsel to assist them in seeking federal habeas relief, while all but 7% of
non-capital prisoners proceed pro se.”).
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the conviction being reversed in habeas.16 Death penalty cases are
not, in the end, the bulk of cases before the federal courts.17 This
Article seeks to examine federal habeas practice as it affects the vast
majority of state inmates.
To begin, the Article must offer contours to what is defined as
“procedural” and “substantive” for habeas law. “Procedure” is used to
describe the doctrines that determine whether a federal court can
reach the merits of a federal claim raised by a state inmate.18 For
example, these procedural mechanisms include exhaustion, or the
requirement that the state prisoner raise the claim in any and all
available state courts;19 a ban on “second or successive” petitions, or
the high hurdle to file more than one habeas corpus application;20
and the one-year statute of limitations.21 Also included is the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine, which bars federal
courts from deciding issues in which the state court based its decision
on an “adequate” state rule that is independent of federal law.22
The “substance” of habeas involves the question of whether there
was a violation of federal law and therefore includes the interwoven
issue of the standard of review used to determine the answer to that
16. Id. at 64 tbl.15 (comparing statistics in capital and non-capital cases).
According to one 2007 study, capital litigants had a 12.4% chance of having relief
granted on any claim (33 of 267 cases examined), while litigants not under a death
sentence had a 0.35% chance of relief on any claim (7 of 1986 cases examined). Id.
Other distinctions include the number of claims raised in the petition and the
likelihood that the state will file an answer or motion in response. Id.
17. See, e.g., FEDERAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 9, at 31 tbl. B-7 (showing
6,444 habeas corpus petitions involving federal questions, i.e., state prisoners, and
186 habeas corpus death penalty cases).
18. See David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735, 738 (1994)
(“[O]ne’s vision of the procedural mechanism of habeas is inevitably colored by one’s
attitude toward the substantive rights that are the subject of habeas litigation.”).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2012) (“An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented.”); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall that a state prisoner must normally
exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his
petition for habeas corpus.” (citation omitted)).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Prior to the enactment of § 2244(b), courts reviewed
the decision whether to consider a subsequent petition under an “abuse of the writ”
standard. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470, 489 (1991) (defining the
“doctrine of abuse of the writ” and clarifying that the Court has not consistently
applied it).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
22. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (“This Court will
not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision . . . rests
on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to
support the judgment.”). While this doctrine is often thought of merely as a
procedural question, the Court will rely on a substantive or procedural state law basis
to warrant protection from federal court interference. Id.
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question.23 Most commonly, this standard of review is whether the
state court’s determination was “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”24 In the
substance of habeas, this Article also includes the rules that
determine which federal law applies to the claims raised. This means
that substantive habeas includes the rules under Teague v. Lane,25
which require that the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that were issued
before the state inmate’s conviction was “final” apply to the inmate,
while those that were issued later do not.26 These categories of
substance and process are not entirely distinct, but they generally
describe the way that habeas actually works.
Part I of this Article describes the habeas landscape as it existed
until recently. It is a procedural story told frequently both before and
after AEDPA’s passage in 1996.27
Part II lays out the shift that is taking place. It primarily examines
Supreme Court decisions as the basis for the conclusion about the
shift in habeas’ focus, although this Part also considers cases from the
lower federal courts as well as scholarly commentary on federal
23. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 381, 382 (1996) [hereinafter Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute]
(quoting the “unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law”
language of AEDPA and stating that “[t]his new provision goes not to the process by
which the federal courts adjudicate claims, but to the substance of the federal courts’
judgment on the merits”). The most obvious alternative approach to substantive
habeas is to consider it substantive only when the Court or Congress limits the actual
types of claims that can be brought. See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might
Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 950 (2000) (noting
that Congress and the Court “have restricted the writ by making it less available as a
practical matter through the creation and expansion of procedural barriers to
federal habeas review” and that “[t]hey have rarely chosen to narrow the writ directly
by limiting the types of federal constitutional claims that state petitioners can bring”).
The only clear example of this is Stone v. Powell, which held that Fourth Amendment
claims are not cognizable in habeas proceedings. 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
25. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Teague, 489 U.S. at 316; see Yackle, A Primer on the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, supra note 23, at 382–83 (discussing § 2254(d) as a substantive
provision and including the Teague line of cases as related to the provision).
A conviction is final after the last state court has issued its decision and the time
for a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court has expired. There are two
narrow exceptions to this general rule. There is certainly a plausible argument that
the Teague line of cases should be viewed as procedural, given that Teague provides
the parameters of the substantive decision that is made, but once it is determined
what law applies, Teague cases do not shape the application of that law to the facts
of the case.
27. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 579, 582 (1982) (criticizing the Burger Court’s restrictions on the scope
of habeas review); Ellyde Roko, Finality, Habeas, Innocence, and the Death Penalty: Can
Justice Be Done?, 85 WASH. L. REV. 107, 120 (2010) (describing the Supreme Court’s
“laser-like focus on procedure” in its review of habeas cases to the detriment of the
substantive issues).
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habeas. The Court’s move, however, is not merely to substantive
habeas: the Court has shifted to a particular, restrictive view of
substantive habeas.
Part III examines the implications of the Court’s move to restrictive
substantive habeas. Specifically, it analyzes the doctrinal twists
created by this new focus and in light of the Court’s existing
priorities. This Part highlights an example of the Court’s previous
focus on proceduralism and argues its current move to restrictive
substantive habeas might create irreconcilable and illogical
conflicts.28 Further, this Part considers the Court’s reasons for
shifting to substantive habeas and finds them insufficient to resolve
this potential conflict.
In Part IV, this Article seeks to give a consistent path to the Court’s
decisions by highlighting a narrative, told before by the Court itself as
well as scholars of expertise, that explains a shift to substantive
habeas, although not the restrictive version adopted by the current
Court. Seen in this light, the Court’s move from procedural to
substantive habeas conforms to an understanding of what the federal
court can do well (and what it cannot). This rationale also
acknowledges the ongoing reality of current habeas practice.
I.

THE PROCEDURAL STORY AND THE REASONS BEHIND IT

The modern habeas story has been one of procedure, both before
and after AEDPA.29 The central questions of this procedural
narrative have been: how wide and when should the door be open to
federal court for state inmates? Answering this question involves
determining, for example, what state inmates must do in state court
to obtain later access to federal court, which implicates the doctrine
of exhaustion, and whether the state court decided the case on
federal law or on purely state law grounds, which implicates the
doctrine of an adequate and independent state law basis.
28. Some scholars have characterized the Court’s previous focus on
proceduralism as “excessive.” See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction
Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face
of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 315–16 (1998) (contrasting the
traditional and modern critiques of excessive proceduralism).
29. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 28, at 323–24 (noting the expansion of habeas,
which resulted in a lack of procedural obstacles for state habeas defendants, after
1953 and prior to the passage of AEDPA); see also Christopher Q. Cutler, Friendly
Habeas Reform—Reconsidering a District Court’s Threshold Role in the Appellate Habeas
Process, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 281, 285–303 (2007) (describing the historical
changes to habeas appellate procedure, from the writ, to statutory and judicial
modifications); Nancy J. King & Suzanna Sherry, Habeas Corpus and State Sentencing
Reform: A Story of Unintended Consequences, 58 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–18 (2008) (retelling the
parallel history of habeas corpus reform and prisoner litigation reform).

THOMAS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SUBSTANTIVE HABEAS

11/7/2014 12:42 PM

1757

A. Historical Development of Habeas Procedure
While federal courts have had jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
petitions of state inmates since 1867,30 these inmates did not begin to
frequently use the writ until decades later.31 For approximately eighty
years, the Supreme Court sporadically engaged in habeas case review
from state prisoners.32 At times, the Court’s relatively sparse review
may even have produced conflicting results.33 During this time, the
Court developed a number of doctrines that limited who should have
access to the federal court and under what circumstances.34 For
example, the Court suggested that federal courts should give the state
court an opportunity to determine federal questions before
considering a writ of habeas corpus from a state prisoner on these
issues—in other words, that state prisoners present their claims first
to the state court.35 In 1948, Congress codified the exhaustion
doctrine.36 These procedural rules were based, in part, on a
perception by scholars and politicians, among others, that access to

30. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (“[T]he several courts of the United
States . . . within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already
conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or
of any treaty or law of the United States.”); see Bator, supra note 9, at 465, 474–77
(noting the “sparse legislative history” of the act granting federal courts review of
state prisoners’ habeas petitions). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1220–23 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the
historical debate about the proper scope of the writ in federal court).
31. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 10, at 52 (noting that habeas review of state
criminal cases in federal courts was relatively limited throughout the earliest decades
of the twentieth century).
32. Id. at 54–55 (attributing the rise in federal review of state habeas cases to the
Warren Court’s expansion of habeas corpus).
33. Compare Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915) (denying habeas relief
despite an angry mob dominating the courtroom atmosphere), with Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90–91 (1923) (citing Mangum but granting relief because the
courtroom was infected with “an irresistible wave of public passion”). But see Eric M.
Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part II: Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the
Historical Roots of Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 1467, 1468–72 (2000) (stating Frank v. Mangum and Moore v. Dempsey shared
“seemingly identical facts” although they “led to diametrically opposed results” and
proposing that the two cases are consistent).
34. See Steiker, supra note 28, at 316 (listing “procedural default, nonretroactivity, exhaustion, and limitation on successive claims” as examples of
procedural doctrines the Court has developed).
35. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252–53 (1886) (rejecting a habeas petition
where the state trial court could consider the constitutional question and did not
have an opportunity to consider it); Bator, supra note 9, at 478 (pointing to Ex parte
Royall as an early exhaustion case); see also Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117–18
(1944) (per curiam) (describing the circumstances under which the exhaustion
doctrine is applicable).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (1994) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012)).
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the federal courts was too permissive.37 While these procedural rules
were being fleshed out, federal habeas courts reviewed questions of
federal law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.38
Therefore, the real limits to federal court review—and the possible
overturning of state court convictions—were the procedural hurdles
in front of the federal courthouse door.
From the 1950s to 1970s, state inmates increasingly used federal
habeas corpus petitions.39 Some scholars attribute this increased use
of the writ to Supreme Court decisions which, first, applied federal
constitutional protections to state defendants40 and, second, often
permitted inmates acting in good faith to obtain federal review of
their constitutional claims.41 For example, in Fay v. Noia,42 the Court
determined that a state prisoner who did not “deliberately bypass[]”
state court procedures could still have his federal constitutional claim

37. See, e.g., Frank J. Remington, Change in the Availability of Federal Habeas Corpus:
Its Significance for State Prisoners and State Correctional Programs, 85 MICH. L. REV. 570,
570–71 (1986) (noting state prisoners’ continued “dissatisfaction” with federal court access).
38. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) (“It is the district judge’s duty
to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings independently.
The state conclusions of law may not be given binding weight on habeas. That was
settled in Brown v. Allen.”), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1 (1992); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., opinion)
(explaining that questions of law and fact are reviewed under the district court
judge’s “own judgment”); see also James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The
Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997,
2011, 2021–26 (1992) (describing the pre-AEDPA de novo review of mixed questions
of fact and law, which had been set out by the Brown Court, as “[t]he guts of the
habeas corpus remedy,” but otherwise arguing for similar treatment of direct review
to the Supreme Court and habeas).
39. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 939–50 (1984) (documenting
the increase in number of habeas and other prisoner cases, including civil rights
cases, from the 1940s to the early 1980s and stating that in 1944, there were 1,312
total prisoner cases (3.4% of the federal docket); in 1963, there were 4,254 total
prisoner filings (6.7% of the docket); and in 1983, there were 30,775 filings (12.7%
of the docket), but noting that, due to increasing prison populations and other
factors, the numbers are misleading); see also KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 10, at 54–
60 (attributing the increase in federal review of state habeas cases to the Warren
Court’s transformation of habeas corpus).
40. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 10, at 55 (describing the expansion of due
process rights from the federal arena to the states); Liebman, supra note 38, at 2044
(suggesting due process protections in habeas proceedings were limited “until the
incorporation movement of the 1940s–1960s”).
41. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1963) (allowing, in some
circumstances, state inmates to file more than one habeas petition); Townsend, 372
U.S. at 314 (allowing federal courts to hold evidentiary hearings if state fact-finding
is flawed); see also Steiker, supra note 28, at 324 (describing the “Golden Age” of state
prisoner habeas as “establish[ing] a presumption in favor of petitioners seeking to
avoid either state procedural defaults or bars to successive federal habeas petitions
and . . . a relatively lenient standard for petitioners seeking to obtain hearings in
federal court on disputed issues of fact” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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heard in habeas.43 These procedural doctrines attempted to balance
concerns for finality, the proper role of the federal courts, and
judicial economy with access to the federal courts by state prisoners
who, through no fault of their own or due to their lack of
understanding, had made procedural mistakes.44
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the Court raised the
procedural hurdles to federal habeas review. The Court constrained
access to the federal courts through the use of procedural default,
exhaustion, and other requirements.45 For example, in Wainwright v.
Sykes,46 the Court revised its procedural default doctrine, determining
that an inmate’s default in state court would bar federal habeas
review absent a showing of “cause” and “prejudice” or of a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.47 The Court stressed that
deciding these procedural issues should, absent extraordinary
circumstances, be a condition precedent to adjudication of the
federal constitutional claim.48 The Court justified these changes as
reflecting respect for the finality of state court convictions,49
federalism, and comity to the state courts.50
B. Proceduralism in the AEDPA Era
In 1996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, which addressed both the procedural and substantive
rules of habeas. On the procedural side, Congress placed a one-year
43. Id. at 439 (using as a formulation for bypass whether there was “an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” (quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 85 (1977) (acknowledging Noia’s establishment of the “deliberate bypass”
procedure (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44. Cf. Resnik, supra note 39, at 881–82 (remarking that, in Fay v. Noia, the
federal courts were “[c]oncerned about equal treatment . . . and opted for
revisionism, consistency, and federal substantive norm enforcement,” and
contrasting those values with the values of finality, economy, and deference to
inmate decision making).
45. Peller, supra note 27, at 582 (criticizing the Burger Court’s restrictions on the
scope of habeas review).
46. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
47. Id. at 86–88 (also rejecting the “sweeping language of Fay v. Noia”).
48. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494–96 (1986) (discussing the need for
both cause and prejudice to be shown to overcome a procedural default, “at least in a
habeas corpus proceeding challenging a state court conviction,” and citing to
“principles of comity and federalism”).
49. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (noting the Court’s
“enduring respect” for the finality of state court decisions).
50. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (noting that the doctrine of
comity promotes, in part, judicial efficiency); see also Resnik, supra note 39, at 889
(“In support of his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist [in Wainwright v. Sykes]
explained his views of procedure, his concerns about economy, finality, ritual, norm
enforcement, first tier authority, and litigant autonomy.”).
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statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas corpus;51
codified, with limited exceptions, the requirement that petitioners
exhaust their state court claims;52 and created restrictions on “second
or successive petitions.”53 AEDPA also placed a higher hurdle to
obtaining an evidentiary hearing in federal court, especially for
petitioners who failed to develop facts in state court.54 AEDPA’s
procedural provisions were designed to speed up the process,55
reduce perceived abuses,56 and avoid repetitive frivolous filing.57
Although AEDPA made procedural alterations, the change it made
to the standard of review was a significant, if not the most significant,
feature.58 AEDPA eliminated the de novo standard of review for cases
in which the state court had examined the federal claim.59 Instead,
federal courts were to grant habeas petitions of state cases that had
been “adjudicated on the merits” only if the state court’s decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law,”60 or if it was “based on an unreasonable
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).
52. Id. § 2254(b)–(c); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (noting
the limited circumstances under which a federal court will not enforce the
exhaustion principle). While related to the federal courts’ treatment of exhaustion,
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), which permits the federal habeas court to deny unexhausted
claims on the merits, is a significant exception to the increased focus on procedure.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Previously, these claims were generally dismissed without
prejudice for the inmate to go back to state court. Unlike many of the other rules
put in place, this provision encourages courts to move to substance, albeit only in the
denial of claims.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654, 664 (1996)
(determining that the successive petition restrictions did not violate the
Suspension Clause).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State
court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); see also
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (limiting development of the factual
record in federal court); infra text accompanying notes 133–37 (discussing Cullen).
55. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276 (“One of the statute’s purposes is to ‘reduce delays
in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital
cases.’” (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003))).
56. H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 944 (describing the “unnecessary delay and abuse” in habeas filings).
57. See generally James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 BUFF. L. REV.
1063, 1080–82 (2008) (tracing concern over repetitive habeas applications from the
mid-20th century to the passage of the AEDPA).
58. See Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, supra note 23, at 382
(stating that the AEDPA standard of review commanded the “lion’s share of
attention”); see also Dan Poulson, Note, Suspension for Beginners: Ex parte Bollman
and the Unconstitutionality of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 386 (2008) (stating that in 18 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), “AEDPA
radically departed from some of the most well-established principles of habeas review”).
59. But see Liebman, supra note 38, at 2011, 2021–26 (describing the pre-AEDPA
de novo standard of review as “the guts of the habeas corpus remedy” and discussing
cases applying that standard).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
[s]tate court proceeding.”61 The legislative history surrounding this
section does not clearly show the origins or goal of this language;
however, Congress knew it would result in a reduction of review by
the federal courts.62 These provisions laid the groundwork for a focus
on the merits of habeas claims. In fact, perhaps the current shift to
substantive habeas is unsurprising: the foundation was laid almost
twenty years ago.
The procedural provisions have, however, had staying power at
center stage.
Even with AEDPA’s significant change to the
substantive standard, the Court focused on interpreting the
procedural provisions of the statute.63
Under the statute of
limitations, for example, the Court interpreted when a state postconviction petition is “pending”64 and “properly filed”65 so that the
one-year statute of limitations is tolled, and when equitable tolling
applies.66 The Court has also interpreted the provision relating to
second and successive habeas petitions67 as well as the meaning of
exhaustion of state court remedies.68
61. Id. § 2254(d)(2).
62. See Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, supra note 23, at 398–99
(indicating that several U.S. senators thought that § 2254(d) would reduce “frivolous
appeals” and “make it more difficult for state prisoners to press federal claims in the
federal district courts”); see also Muhammad Usman Faridi, Comment, Streamlining
Habeas Corpus While Undermining Judicial Review: How 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) Violates
the Constitution, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 361, 376–78 (2006) (quoting excerpts of the
congressional debate on AEDPA and describing it as not shedding any “real light” on
the change in the standard of review); Terrell J. Iandiorio, Comment, Federal
Postconviction Relief and 28 U.S.C. § 2255(4): Are State Court Decisions “Facts”?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1157–58 (2004) (reviewing AEDPA’s congressional testimony and
concluding that Congress was not concerned with habeas relief but, rather, with
capital cases).
63. See Ellyde Roko, Finality, Habeas, Innocence, and the Death Penalty: Can Justice Be
Done?, 85 WASH. L. REV. 107, 120 (2010) (describing the Supreme Court’s “laser-like
focus on procedure” in its review of habeas cases).
64. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329, 337 (2007) (determining that
§ 2244(d)(2)’s one-year statute of limitations is not tolled during the time between a
final state court judgment on a state post-conviction motion and the filing of a U.S.
Supreme Court petition for certiorari); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002)
(interpreting § 2244(d)(2) to mean that a state post-conviction case is pending “until the
application has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures”).
65. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (finding a state court
petition that was untimely was not “properly filed” and therefore that the petitioner
was “not entitled to . . . tolling under § 2244(d)(2)” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (affirming that AEDPA’s
statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling); Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336
(assuming but not deciding that equitable tolling was available if petitioner shows
that “(1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing” (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418)).
67. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007) (per curiam) (holding that a
district court did not have jurisdiction to hear a successive petition because the
relevant U.S. court of appeals had not authorized filing of a “second and successive”
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Through its cases restricting procedural avenues for habeas relief,
the Court tried to encourage state courts to develop post-conviction
procedures to which the federal courts would defer,69 efficiently
resolve habeas cases, and give due deference to state law and state
court rulings.70 This last goal relates to comity to the state courts and
reflects a desire to leave the state courts to their own affairs in a
federalist system of government.71 While these narratives have
dominated the Court’s cases, scholars examining habeas have put
forth a multiplicity of views.72
petition, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662
(2001) (determining that a successive petition based on retroactive law, under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), may only be filed when the Supreme Court holds that the
new rule is retroactively applicable); see also Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,
542, 554 (1998) (determining that the federal circuit court abused its discretion in
recalling the mandate even though it complied with the AEDPA by ruling based on
the initial, rather than a successive, petition).
68. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847–48 (1999) (holding that state
inmates must file for discretionary relief in the state court of last resort to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement).
69. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 10, at 49 (“[T]he ridiculously low success
rate of noncapital habeas petitioners today is linked with the dramatic expansion of
state judicial review of federal claims between the 1960s and the 1980s—a structural
change that habeas review actually helped to bring about.”); see also id. at 67
(“Expansive habeas review . . . spurred the states to create new and improved avenues
for judicial review where convicted defendants could litigate claims in state court
based on that federal law[.]”).
70. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (stating that a trial in
state court should be the “a decisive and portentous event[, and to] . . . the greatest
extent possible all issues which bear on [the charges brought] should be determined
in [that] proceeding”), with id. at 111 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defending a contrary
decision on these grounds by stating that “[a] regime of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction that permits the reopening of state procedural defaults does not
invalidate any state procedural rule as such; [the state’s] courts remain entirely free
to enforce their own rules as they choose, and to deny any and all state rights and
remedies to a defendant who fails to comply with applicable state procedure”
(footnote omitted)). For a substantive version of this, see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), which describes one requirement for post-conviction federal
review as “difficult to meet” and a “highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (citing the goal of
comity). The Court has defined comity as respect for state court functions that
leaves the state courts free from federal intrusion and emphasized comity’s central
role in avoiding conflicts between the state and federal governments. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)); see also Norlynn Blocker, Comment, An Exercise in
Comity: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 35 BAYLOR L.
REV. 497, 506 (1983) (explaining the origins of comity and its importance to federalism).
The Supreme Court rediscovered the importance of comity in a series of cases
restricting collateral attack on the racial composition of grand juries. See Wainwright,
433 U.S. at 84 (citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538–39 (1976)); see also
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 367, 384 & n.142 (1983) (outlining the line of cases requiring cause and
prejudice to overcome procedural default).
72. Some scholars have focused on the process available to state inmates. See,
e.g., Bator, supra note 9, at 443–44 (suggesting a lesser role for the federal habeas
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Before moving on, this Article briefly considers a few possible
explanations for why the Court has focused on process for so long.
One possible reason is the nature of post-conviction cases. Many
cases involve the mere application of set habeas law to a particular
case. Habeas cases that focus on the application of a constitutional
protection—for example, whether or not counsel was ineffective in a
given case—are not solely cases about the interpretation of habeas
statutes.73 They are also cases that go to the actual claims raised on
habeas.74 These cases, therefore, do not surface as cases about the
scope or interpretation of habeas, and result in construing the field
of relevant cases more narrowly.75 In this light, the focus on
procedure makes particular sense in the pre-AEDPA era, when
federal courts reviewed legal questions and mixed questions of fact

court where the state courts have provided a full forum for resolution of the legal
claim). Others have emphasized concern about convictions of innocent defendants.
See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142–43 (1971) (contemplating innocence in habeas
cases where parties are seeking collateral relief). Still others have advocated for
habeas as a vehicle for structural reform. These scholars would drastically limit the
claims that are cognizable in habeas and use the resources that are freed up to fix
other structural problems, such as indigent criminal defenses and repeated violations
of criminal defendants’ rights. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King,
Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 791 (2009)
(proposing that the federal government invest resources in improving governmentsponsored defense services); Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010) (refocusing habeas relief from an individual
perspective to an eye to “systemic criminal justice reforms”).
73. AEDPA requires that the federal courts apply “clearly established” U.S.
Supreme Court case law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). Therefore, the Court has a
limited opportunity to develop criminal constitutional law in habeas cases. See
Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011) (limiting “clearly established Federal law”
to include only Supreme Court cases decided before an inmate’s state court
adjudication (internal quotation marks omitted)); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316
(1989) (limiting the law that can be used by prisoners after their direct appeal).
74. This is particularly true of the scores of unpublished habeas denials. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Epps, 359 F. App’x. 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming a
denial of habeas because the introduction of improper testimony did not improperly
influence the jury and therefore did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel);
Sam v. Hartley, 359 F. App’x. 12, 14, 21–22 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming a denial of
habeas because, among other things, the petitioner’s trial counsel’s failure to
investigate certain witnesses and the crime scene did not prejudice the petitioner);
see also Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (per curiam) (finding that the
Court’s prior law did not clearly establish that ineffective assistance of counsel was
given when the attorney appeared by speaker phone for the defendant’s no contest plea).
75. Some cases clarify and interpret a provision of AEDPA and then go on to
address the claims on the merits. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)
(interpreting AEDPA and then addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
In Wiggins, the Court found, on the performance prong of Strickland v. Washington,
that an unreasonable application of Strickland had occurred; however, the meat of its
opinion focused on determining whether or not the petitioner’s trial counsel
violated Strickland by failing to investigate the client’s case. See id. at 533–34 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 690–91(1984)).
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and law de novo.76 As a result, lower federal court substantive decisions
did not raise issues of federal habeas statutory interpretation.
Additionally, the Court is less likely to take cases in which the
AEDPA’s interpretive issues are clearly resolved because cases that
focus merely on whether the writ should have been granted do not
answer systemic questions.77 Instead, these cases are more likely to
apply the law to the peculiar facts of the case. These features of
habeas law may help explain why the Court, before AEDPA,
significantly reviewed procedural questions and continued to do so
after AEDPA.
C. Effects of Proceduralism
The focus on proceduralism is not without its critics.78
Proceduralism has costs for coherence, litigants, courts, and even the
very goals that motivated it. These procedural cases gave rise to
habeas doctrines that are, at best, convoluted and difficult to
understand.79 The complexity of habeas procedure is exacerbated
because, as mentioned earlier, state inmates who are not subject to
capital sentences rarely have a lawyer representing them in federal
habeas.80 This means that state prisoners may initially mis-present the
issues for the federal courts’ consideration and may omit important
aspects of the argument or ramifications of their positions. As a
result, the federal courts are commanded to impose these procedural
barriers, yet also feel constrained to take into account the lack of

76. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 115 (1985) (stating that
voluntariness of confession is a legal question entitled to plenary review).
77. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (cautioning that review is “rarely granted” when the error is
“misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”).
78. See Steiker, supra note 28, at 315–16 (critiquing the “overproceduralism” of
postconviction litigation). But see Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather
than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 139–40 (2012) (arguing for procedural due
process as a method for enhanced review beyond what AEDPA provides).
79. See Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1738 (2000)
(“The Court’s current doctrine is notoriously complex, confusing if not confused.”);
see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 649 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (“Our
habeas jurisprudence is taking on the appearance of a confused patchwork in which
different constitutional rights are treated according to their status.”).
80. See Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need for Equitable Tolling of the Habeas
Corpus Statute of Limitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 46 (2004) (noting that most inmates
are pro se, and “rationalize” their errors due to illiteracy and lack of counsel); Jessica
Feierman, “The Power of the Pen”: Jailhouse Lawyers, Literacy, and Civic Engagement, 41
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 369–70 (2006) (explaining that, in addition to barriers
created by indigency and illiteracy, prisoners’ full access to courts is constrained by
their dependence on prison legal resources).
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counsel.81 And, to the extent that pro se cases are used as examples
for later decisions, these cases do not make reliably good law.
Further, the cost of proceduralism to inmates is high. The
procedural hurdles slow many pro se inmates who navigate habeas
without the assistance of counsel.82 In a recent study, researchers
found that 13.3% of cases included at least one procedurally
defaulted claim, 10.9% of cases were dismissed as unexhausted,
21.7% of cases were dismissed as time barred, and only 0.35% of cases
were granted relief on any claim.83 This frustration of inmates is
intentional. Yet, it is not without important systemic implications
because inmates come to perceive the criminal system as a cruel and
unjust game in which the courts avoid hearing their claims, no matter
how meritorious.84
The Court’s obsession with habeas proceduralism has also
exhausted litigants and judges. Congress, in AEDPA, attempted to
prioritize efficiency over proceduralism for its own sake.85 Federal
courts have also attempted to circumvent the arcane and
unintelligible world of proceduralism. For example, the courts, in
the name of judicial economy, may skip an examination of
procedural default—a threshold question in habeas review—and move
directly to the merits of the case to avoid the procedural quagmire.86
81. See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[T]he allegations of a pro se litigant’s complaint are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam))); see Feierman, supra note 80, at 385–86 (suggesting
a possible answer in enhanced legal education and library access for prisoners).
82. A slow process that requires absolute exhaustion has ramifications for both
prisoners and the courts. For prisoners, a slow process means that only those
prisoners serving lengthy sentences will ever contemplate habeas relief, and those
who do file for relief will feel obligated to raise weaker post-conviction claims in
addition to their stronger claims. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 10, at 80
(“[F]ederal courts actually take longer to resolve habeas petitions today than they did
before the 1996 AEDPA statutory reforms that were designed to shorten the process.”).
83. Id. at 79 tbl.4.1; see also KING, ET AL., supra note 14, at 52 (providing statistics
for post-AEDPA habeas litigation in federal courts, including an estimated rate of
relief of less than one percent for non-capital cases); Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great
Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (2006) (providing a
personal account of the challenges and frustrations of litigating pro se from the inside
of a Florida jail cell).
84. See Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 350 (2006)
[hereinafter Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment] (“[M]ost prisoners’
complaints about wrongful convictions, illegal sentences, and other errors for which
there is a constitutional remedy are never addressed on the merits.”).
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012) (allowing federal courts to deny a habeas
petition on the merits, even if the prisoner failed to exhaust state court remedies).
86. See, e.g., Simpson v. Warren, 662 F. Supp. 2d 835, 846 (E.D. Mich. 2009)
(“[T]he Court finds that the procedural issue is complex and the interests of judicial
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Restrictive proceduralism does not even always respect the goals it
sets out to achieve. Habeas procedural litigation undeniably involves
the federal courts mucking around in state procedural law. Federal
courts, for example, determine whether states consistently apply their
procedural rules and scrutinize the exceptions that state courts make
to these rules87 as well as whether or not the state court rules give
defendants a full opportunity to litigate their claims.88 In other
words, a focus on proceduralism does not prevent the federal courts
from making significant interpretations of state law. It is a myth that
focusing on limiting the number of inmates who enter through the
door is necessarily respectful of the state courts’ autonomy to
determine their own rules and decide their own cases.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT SHIFT TO RESTRICTIVE
SUBSTANTIVE HABEAS
The passage of AEDPA set the stage for a move to substantive
habeas, but its passage did not immediately create this shift. Instead,
the shift has materialized through recent Supreme Court cases that,
to a great extent, focus on the substantive questions that AEDPA
highlighted or created. Moreover, the Court’s move is not only to
substantive habeas, but also toward a restrictive substantive habeas.89
A. AEDPA’s New Standard of Review
The origins of the shift to a non-procedural approach to habeas are
found in AEDPA. However, AEDPA did not accomplish this shift by
itself. As mentioned above, AEDPA’s language narrowed both the
substantive and the procedural avenues to habeas corpus relief. On
the substantive side, AEDPA altered the standard by which the federal
courts examined questions of law and mixed questions of law and
economy are best served by addressing the merits of Petitioner’s claims.”), aff’d, 475
F. App’x 51 (6th Cir. 2012).
87. See, e.g., Conner v. Hall, 645 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding
Georgia’s miscarriage of justice exception was inconsistently applied and therefore
incapable of barring federal review).
88. See Hampton v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2002) (listing the circuit’s
three considerations for a court to find a “full and fair opportunity to litigate”—
namely, (1) the inmate must plead and argue a factual basis for a constitutional
violation “(2) the state court has carefully and thoroughly analyzed the facts and (3)
applied the proper constitutional case law to the facts”).
89. This move to restrictive substantive habeas review may have constitutional
implications. For example, some have argued that § 2254(d) violates the Suspension
Clause and interferes with Article III powers of the federal courts. See, e.g., Faridi,
supra note 62, at 364 (arguing that § 2254’s new “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law” standard infringes on federal courts’
powers of judicial review (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000) (declining to address the constitutionality of § 2254).
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fact. Prior to AEDPA’s passage, the federal courts reviewed both
types of questions de novo.90 Under AEDPA, the federal courts were
limited to granting relief on cases that were “adjudicated on the
merits” to situations in which the state court decision was “contrary
to” or “an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.”91
Despite the shift in language in both the procedural and
substantive aspects of habeas, at least some scholars believed that the
Court had already done the most significant procedural “reforms”
prior to the passage of AEDPA.92 Other scholars echoed the limited
impact of AEDPA on the substantive side, suggesting that the
“unreasonable application” language had little actual effect on the
federal courts’ decisions.93
After AEDPA, the federal circuit courts put forth divergent
understandings of this standard of review language. The Supreme
Court construed the language in Williams v. Taylor,94 holding that
relief could only be granted if the state court decision was “contrary
to” or “an unreasonable application of” U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.95 An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs
when the state court “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but
applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.”96
A decision is “contrary to” federal law “if the state court applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law” or “confronts a set of facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.”97

90. Liebman, supra note 38, at 2014.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
92. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 12, at 271 (summarizing the Court’s procedural
decisions prior to AEDPA).
93. See, e.g., Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative
Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 950–52, 959 (1998) (maintaining that the
“unreasonable application” language was designed to encourage federal courts to
defer to the states and limit habeas remedies, as well as that the AEDPA
“supplements,” rather than “supplant[s],” Supreme Court precedent in this area
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some
Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking That Article III and the
Supremacy Clause Demand of the Federal Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 867 (1998)
(arguing, in response, that the “unreasonable application” phrase only matters in
situations without clearly established law).
94. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
95. Id. at 407–08.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 405–06. Justice Stevens, in a four Justice opinion, argued that restricting
the substantive standard of review conflicted with a federal court’s duty under Article III
to declare the meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 378–79 (plurality opinion).
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B. Post-AEDPA Stasis After Williams v. Taylor
Over the next ten years, the Court, with a few exceptions, did not
focus on interpreting the “unreasonable application” provision but,
instead, relied on per curiam opinions to define the contours of
AEDPA’s language.98 The exceptions are worth noting. For example,
in Yarborough v. Alvarado,99 the Court explained that courts are more
likely to be deemed “reasonable” when interpreting general rules
than specific ones.100 The Court also decided a few cases where it
found an unreasonable application of law.101
In Schriro v.
102
the Court may have signaled its future interest in
Landrigan,
restricting substantive habeas.103
In light of this fairly minimal guidance from the Supreme Court,
lower courts interpreted and applied AEDPA language in various
ways. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was robust in developing Williams v. Taylor. The Second Circuit
reiterated that an unreasonable application “must be not only
erroneous but also unreasonable. Some increment of incorrectness
beyond error is required.”104 The court then cautioned that “the
98. See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010) (per curiam) (reversing the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and finding that a state supreme court’s
rejection of defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim was not an unreasonable
application of federal law); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437–39 (2004) (per
curiam) (determining, without briefing or oral argument, that the state court
opinion was not unreasonable when it acknowledged faulty jury instructions and did
not “ignor[e]” them as the Ninth Circuit had claimed (alteration in original));
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 21, 24, 27 (2002) (per curiam) (reversing the
Ninth Circuit and concluding that, even though it may not have made the same
determination as the state court, the state court’s decision was nevertheless not
“unreasonable” under the AEDPA (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009) (per curiam) (finding that the state
court’s failure to give appropriate weight to pertinent facts was an unreasonable
application of the Strickland standard in light of the mitigation evidence adduced in
the post-conviction hearing).
99. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
100. See id. at 664 (reasoning that the application of general rules requires
judgment and that the meaning of general rules can emerge over time).
101. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934–35 (2007) (holding that a
state’s finding of competency was an unreasonable application of Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986), in light of the process the state court used to deny defendant to
be heard on the issue of competency); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390–93
(2005) (explaining that the state court’s failure to find a Strickland violation when
counsel failed to go to the courthouse to look at a publicly available file was an
unreasonable application and warranted relief); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534–
35, 538 (2003) (holding that a state court decision based on a clear factual error was
an unreasonable application of Strickland).
102. 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
103. See id. at 473 (stating that AEDPA’s “unreasonable” standard is “a substantially
higher threshold” for obtaining relief than the pre-AEDPA standard of review); see
also Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24 (“[AEDPA] demands that state-court decisions be given
the benefit of the doubt.”).
104. Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
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increment [of incorrectness] need not be great.”105 The Second
Circuit’s subsequent cases developed what “increment of
incorrectness” is needed to warrant an “unreasonable application.”106
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
developed its own interpretation of “objectively unreasonable.” The
Ninth Circuit has stated “a judgment is objectively unreasonable
when it is clearly erroneous.”107 The Ninth Circuit has further
explained that a conviction must stand unless it leaves the court with
a “definite and firm conviction that an error has been committed.”108
In the years following, the court expanded and interpreted what cases
rose to this level.109
One ultimately unconvincing reason that the Supreme Court is
only now turning to substantive habeas is that, until now, these issues
were not ripe for review. It is possible that the Court did not have a
case before it that was an appropriate vehicle for deciding these
substantive questions, but this reason seems unlikely. There have
been a plethora of cases that posed interpretative questions regarding
the substantive provisions of habeas law since AEDPA’s passage.110 As
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Ramchair v. Conway, 601 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2010); Wilson v.
Mazzuca, 570 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 2009); Brinson v. Walker, 547 F.3d 387, 389 (2d
Cir. 2008); Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 791 (2d Cir. 2006); Cox v. Donnelly, 432
F.3d 388, 390–91 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Gersten v. Senkowski, 426 F.3d 588,
615 (2d Cir. 2005); Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2005); Jackson v.
Edwards, 404 F.3d 612, 615 (2d Cir. 2005); Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82, 84–85 (2d
Cir. 2004); Torres v. Berbary, 340 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Cotto v. Herbert, 331
F.3d 217, 258 (2d Cir. 2003); Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2002); Jenkins
v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 286–87 (2d Cir. 2002); Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 116 (2d
Cir. 2001); Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2001); Boyette v.
Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2001); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 193 (2d
Cir. 2001).
107. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).
108. See Gunn v. Ignacio, 263 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2001).
109. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 2010); Slovik v. Yates, 556
F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 2009); Burdge v. Belleque, 290 F. App’x 73, 79 (9th Cir.
2008); Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Parle v.
Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 2007); Winzer v. Hall, 494 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th
Cir. 2007); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2006); Gautt v. Lewis, 489
F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2007); Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 2006);
Nelson v. Washington, 172 F. App’x 748, 749 (9th Cir. 2006); Juan H. v. Allen, 408
F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004);
Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 996, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2004); Chia v. Cambra, 360
F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 2004); Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 2003);
Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2003); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d
848, 850 (9th Cir. 2003); Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2003); Bradley v.
Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081,
1084 (9th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 2002).
110. See, e.g., McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(“The increment need not necessarily be great, but it must be great enough to make
the decision unreasonable in the independent and objective judgment of the federal
court.”); Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that
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noted above, the Second and Ninth Circuit engaged in interpretation
When the
of AEDPA’s unreasonable application language.111
Supreme Court perceived that the lower courts had gone too far, the
Court issued perfunctory reversals based on its belief that the state
court decision was not an unreasonable application of law.112 Only
now has the Court reached out to squarely address these issues.
C. Current Court: Narrowing in Practice
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court’s attention has
returned to the substance of habeas.113 In a string of recent cases, the
Court has accomplished the narrow substantive review that was only
made possible by the changed language of AEDPA. These recent
cases have expanded the number of inmate petitions subject to
substantive review and severely restricted the substantive scope of
federal court review.
In Renico v. Lett,114 the Court started to narrow (or clarified
Congress’s intent to narrow) the standard of review.115 In support,
the Court cited Williams v. Taylor and other cases that referenced
“deference” given to state court’s determinations.116 The Court gave
additional deference to state courts depending on the nature of the
claim, stating, “[t]he more general the rule at issue—and thus the
greater the potential for reasoned disagreement among fair-minded
reversing a state court is appropriate when the state court “applies the correct legal
rule” in a “patently incorrect” manner); Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 591–92
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[w]hen the constitutional standard is flexible, and the
state court takes the rule seriously and produces an answer within the range of
defensible positions, § 2254(d)(1) requires the federal court to deny the petition”);
Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he fact that one court or
even a few courts have applied the precedent in the same manner to close facts does
not make the state court decision reasonable.”).
111. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text (describing the Second and
Ninth Circuits’ interpretations and listing cases).
112. See, e.g., Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437–39 (2004) (per curiam)
(reversing, without briefing or argument, the Ninth Circuit because the state court
opinion was not unreasonable).
113. To be sure, the Court has not abandoned deciding procedural questions. See,
e.g., Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1281–82 (2011) (finding that petitioner’s motion
to reduce his sentence tolled the statute of limitations and, therefore, that his habeas
petition was timely); Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1124, 1131 (2011)
(determining that a California timeliness rule was an adequate and independent
grounds for its decision and reversing the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent grant of the
habeas corpus petition).
114. 130 S. Ct. 1855 (2010).
115. Id. at 1862.
116. Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2000), and other cases).
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenting Justices, objected that AEDPA’s language
does not require “deference.” Id. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Other than these
references and citation to the statute, the majority did not expound on the rationale
for deferential review.
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judges—the more leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in
case-by-case determinations.”117 In Lett, the petitioner had raised a
double jeopardy claim.118 The state court of last resort determined that
the trial court had exercised “sound discretion.”119 The U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that the state court decision was not “unreasonable”
in light of the general standard the state court was applying.120
The following year, in Harrington v. Richter,121 the Court expanded
on the concept of “deference” to state courts that it had discussed in
Lett.122 Richter addressed whether summary state court orders
deciding constitutional claims, but providing no reasoning, would be
reviewed under an “unreasonable application” or de novo
standard.123 The Court found that “unreasonable application” review
was appropriate.124 Richter involved an allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,125 and the Court
emphasized the particular deference due where state courts applied a
“general” legal standard.126 Citing the same language from earlier
opinions that was cited in Lett, the Court then expanded on the
meaning of “unreasonable application” review.127 It concluded that
the “state court must be granted deference and latitude,” that the
AEDPA standard is “difficult to meet,” and that AEDPA is only
satisfied when the state court is “so lacking in justification that there
[is] an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.”128 The Court’s
117. Id. at 1864 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
118. Id. at 1861–62.
119. Id. at 1861 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 1864.
121. 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
122. See, e.g., id. at 786 (stating that “even a strong case for relief does not mean
the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable”); cf. Bator, supra note 9, at
489 (suggesting that the thoroughness of the state decision making process may have
been relevant to the Court in deciding when a case is suitable for federal intervention).
123. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784–85. The question of what deference to give to a
state’s unspoken or unreasoned opinion has received a fair amount of commentary
since the passage of AEDPA. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Habeas Review of Perfunctory State
Court Decisions on the Merits, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 227 n.26, 241 (2002) (listing circuit
court cases disagreeing on the meaning of adjudication under the AEDPA and later
proposing that AEDPA deference be conditioned on an expressed federal rationale
citing federal law).
124. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
125. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
126. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783, 788.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 785–87. Because the state court in Richter did not explain its decision,
the Court stated that “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories
supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision” and evaluate
whether “fairminded jurists could disagree” with these hypothetical reasons for the
state court’s decision. Id. at 786; see Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1784–85
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decision simultaneously expanded the number of cases in which
federal courts will review state court decisions under the AEDPA
“unreasonable application” standard, while making that review more
deferential than before.129
In embracing a narrow version of substantive review, the Court
pointed to “familiar” reasons—respect for the state court’s “goodfaith attempts to honor constitutional rights,” the state’s interest in
concluding litigation, and the state’s power to punish offenders.130
The Court asserted that deferential substantive review complemented
the procedural default doctrine and kept state courts as the
“principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges.”131 The
Court also embraced the view that habeas should be reserved to
“guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems, [and] not . . . substitute for ordinary error correction
through appeal.”132
The same term, in Cullen v. Pinholster,133 the Supreme Court held
“that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”134 In
(2013) (reversing grant of habeas petition by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit because the petition did not meet AEDPA’s “unreasonable application, of
clearly established Federal law” standard); Marceau, supra note 78, at 88 (construing
Richter as “in favor of substantially curtailing federal courts’ authority to overturn a
state conviction or sentence”); Daniel J. O’Brien, Heeding Congress’s Message: The
United States Supreme Court Bars Federal Courthouse Doors to Habeas Relief Against All but
Irrational State Court Decisions, and Oftentimes Doubly So, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 320 (2012)
(stating that Richter was a turning point in the Court’s application of habeas review);
Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis
of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 220 (2013) (acknowledging that a habeas petition
must “show that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief”
(quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
129. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 128, at 320 (stating that the Court has “driven
home the point with unmistakable clarity” that significant deference is to be given to
the state court, even when these courts provide no explanation for their rejection of
the federal claim).
130. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (citing cases in which the Court upheld
procedural bars to federal court review of state inmates’ constitutional claims).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 786 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens,
J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Comparatively, some scholars
have advanced habeas as something akin to appellate review of federal issues decided
in state court. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977) (discussing the
benefits of dialogue between state and federal courts that led to reforms of criminal
procedure under the Warren Court); Hoffstadt, supra note 23, at 971 (explaining
that habeas is the only meaningful opportunity for federal court review of defective
state court adjudications); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 991, 997 (1985) (discussing the inability of defendants to remove to federal
court); see also Peller, supra note 27, at 666 (highlighting concerns about the effect of
electoral politics on state court judges).
133. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
134. Id. at 1398.
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other words, “evidence later introduced in federal court is irrelevant
to § 2254(d)(1) review.”135 The Court gave some substance to the
legislative intent behind AEDPA, stating—without citing legislative
history or prior AEDPA opinions—that “the broader context of the
statute as a whole . . . demonstrates Congress’ intent to channel
prisoners’ claims first to the state court.”136 The Court also repeated
Richter’s “difficult to meet” language and determined that Pinholster’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not surmount the “high
threshold” for habeas relief.137
In Johnson v. Williams,138 a follow-up case to Richter, the Court held
that federal claims that were not explicitly addressed by the state
court—even if the state court decided other claims—were entitled to
a rebuttable presumption that the claims were “adjudicated on the
merits” and, therefore, subject to § 2254(d)’s deferential review.139
The next term, in White v. Woodall,140 the Court revisited the
question of what is “clearly established” law, reiterating that the
federal courts must focus on the Court’s prior holdings and reversing
a grant of habeas based on what the Court deemed was not “squarely
established” law.141
The Court has been applying the constraints laid out in these cases
to expand the reach of deferential review, deny habeas, and overturn

135. Id. at 1400. Pinholster can arguably be seen as focusing on a procedural,
instead of a substantive, question. On its face, whether an evidentiary hearing is held
appears to be a procedural question. However, the Court has linked the deference
given to the substance of state court decisions to the question of when a hearing can
occur. Specifically, the district court has discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing
and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) focuses that discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
(2012) (stating a court “shall not” hold a hearing unless the petitioner satisfies
certain criteria). The federal courts’ discretion was also cabined because they must
consider “the deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 . . . in deciding whether an
evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).
But Pinholster barred consideration of federal court evidence in the substantive
determination under 28 USC 2254(d)(1).
136. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398–99 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Pinholster Court was also forced to explain possible inconsistencies between Williams
v. Taylor, which it said only addressed whether § 2254(e)(2), not § 2254(d)(1),
barred an evidentiary hearing, as well as the more recent case of Schriro v. Landrigan,
which directed federal courts account for the deferential AEDPA standard when
determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1399–1400; see also
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474 (interpreting AEDPA’s requirements for granting evidentiary
hearings); (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
137. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398, 1402–03.
138. 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013).
139. Id. at 1091–92.
140. 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014).
141. Id. at 1706 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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grants of habeas by the federal courts of appeal.142 One motivation
for the Court’s recent enthusiasm for clarifying substantive habeas
standards may be a belief that the lower federal courts have been
applying AEDPA’s standard too laxly. In any case, the Court is
reversing federal appellate courts that, as the Court sees it, exceed
the tight constraints the Court has placed on habeas relief.143 For
example, in reversing a grant of habeas in Parker v. Matthews,144 the
Court looked to the Kentucky state court’s unexplained decision on
the federal question, applied a deferential review of this unexplained
decision, and chastened the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit for looking at its own precedent to determine reasonableness.145
By contrast, the current Court has been less active in interpreting
procedural provisions and, to the extent that it is addressing these
cases, seems to be easing slightly on its earlier restrictions on
procedural habeas. For example, the Court recently held that the
one-year statute of limitations period was subject to equitable
tolling.146 Similarly, while the Court recently upheld prior law
allowing the federal court of appeals to sua sponte raise a statute of
limitations bar,147 it later found that an appellate court erroneously
did so where the state had waived the defense.148 Consistent with the
relaxation of habeas proceduralism, the Court has begun to ease its
procedural default rules for inmates raising ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. In states where those claims must be raised in a state
post-conviction petition149 or states that deny “a meaningful
opportunity” to litigate an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal,150
the Court now allows the lack of post-conviction counsel, or even the
142. See Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011) (holding that habeas courts
must apply the substantive federal law in effect at the time of the last reasoned state
court decision, further limiting their ability to apply more recent Supreme Court
precedent to inmates’ cases and even when their cases are still on direct appeal).
143. See, e.g., Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1707 (reversing a Sixth Circuit habeas grant);
Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7 (2011) (per curiam) (finding that there was no
unreasonable application of law and reversing—for the third time—the Ninth
Circuit’s decision).
144. 132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 2153–56.
146. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010).
147. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (affirming the habeas
petition dismissal for untimeliness).
148. See Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (2012) (concluding the circuit
court should have reached the merits of the case where the government chose not to
address an “‘arguable’ statute of limitations defense”).
149. See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313, 1315 (2012) (indicating that
Arizona does not allow such claims to be brought on direct review and allowing a
petitioner to show “cause” to overcome procedural default when there is an
“[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings”).
150. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013).
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failures of post-conviction counsel, to provide cause to excuse the
default of an ineffectiveness claim.151
In summary, the Court, both before and after passage of AEDPA,
has constrained state prisoners’ access to federal court by creating
significant procedural barriers,152 and it has also answered many of
the pressing procedural questions left open by the AEDPA. Despite
these barriers, state inmates have persisted in their pursuit of federal
review and, at least in some cases, have surmounted the procedural
hurdles, albeit in smaller percentages than before AEDPA.153 In the
past few years, and over a relatively short period of time, the Court
has refocused its attention on the substantive provisions governing
habeas review, in contrast to its previous focus on restricting the
procedural avenues of habeas petitioners.154 This substantive review
has constrained the lower federal courts’ ability to review state court
convictions for constitutional error. The Court can, and has, defined
AEDPA in a way that forces federal courts to deny habeas even when
the state court is wrong,155 has summarily denied a claim without
giving a reason,156 has implicitly denied a federal claim by denying
other claims in the appeal,157 or has failed to apply significant
changes in constitutional law.158 Thus, the Court has expanded the
number of inmate petitions subject to substantive review and severely
restricted the substantive scope of federal court review.

151. Id.; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (laying out the cause
and prejudice requirements to overcome procedural default).
152. See Resnik, supra note 39, at 872, 874 (“Complex procedural schemes may
also evidence beliefs about the importance or difficulty of a category of cases to be
decided. . . . Alternatively, those hostile to the rights may create so cumbersome a
procedure as to make rights enforcement extraordinary difficult. . . .
[C]ontemporary federal habeas corpus has become a law of closure, of complex
procedural obstacles that preclude adjudication on the merits. Current case law is
dominated by announcements of new procedural requirements or refinements of
those already in place.”).
153. According to one study, in 16% of capital cases and 1.7% of non-capital cases,
a petitioner overcame procedural default on at least one claim. KING ET AL., supra
note 14, at 48; see also KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 69 fig.4.1 (showing a sharp
decline in the number of habeas filings relative to the population growth in state
prisons between 1950 and 2009).
154. See, e.g., Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011).
155. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (“Although the state-court decision
may be contrary to the federal court’s conception of how Strickland ought to be applied
in that particular case, the decision is not ‘mutually opposed’ to Strickland itself.”).
156. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011).
157. See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1098–99 (2013).
158. See Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 45.
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III. SUBSTANTIVE HABEAS IN SEARCH OF A LOGICAL LIMIT
Just after the passage of AEDPA, Larry Yackle suggested that an
understanding of AEDPA’s substantive language would have to
account for the procedural limits imposed on habeas petitioners so
that a coherent system could emerge.159
In addition to the
theoretical or political goals the Court embraces for habeas, the
Court’s interpretations should be logically consistent with prior
doctrine. The Court’s current direction fails to account for Professor
Yackle’s early, and telling, observation. Part III discusses the current
Court’s failure, in its move to restrictive substantive habeas, to
account for prior doctrine or the realities of practice.
A. Making Procedural Default Attractive?: The Triumph of Restrictive
Substantive Habeas Over Procedural Habeas
This Section briefly surveys the goals and limitations of procedural
default, one arm of the Court’s prior procedural habeas focus,
because they create a backdrop for the Court’s current cases. This
Section also discusses an example of an illogical effect of the Court’s
prior emphasis on proceduralism combined with its current
enthusiasm for restrictive substantive habeas. The example is telling
not because it occurs frequently: it most certainly does not. Instead,
the example highlights the real world possibility that the current
direction of habeas doctrine does not adequately account for all of
the pieces of the habeas puzzle.
Procedural default requires petitioners to present their claims to
state courts, in compliance with state requirements, in order to be
permitted to have these claims later reviewed by the federal courts.160
In the mid-20th century, some Justices on the Court promoted the
use of state procedural rules to parse good petitions from bad
petitions161 because, in part, of fear that perpetual relitigation of

159. See Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, supra note 23, at 384
(“Those procedural measures would be unintelligible if § 2254(d) undermined the
federal courts’ authority to determine the merits of claims when they are presented
seasonably and in a proper procedural posture.”).
160. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963) (describing procedural default as a
“doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to constitute an adequate
and independent state law barring direct Supreme Court review”), overruled in part by
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
161. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 503 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
(“Normally rights under the Federal Constitution may be waived at the trial, and may
likewise be waived by failure to assert such errors on appeal.” (citation omitted)); see
also id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring) (proposing the “observance of procedural
safeguards” to separate meritorious petitions for habeas corpus from those that are
“frivolous,” “unintelligible,” and “meaningless”).
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factual issues detracted from the great writ.162 At its core, procedural
default is designed to cabin the reach of federal habeas.
After initially treating procedural default as a complete bar to
review, the Court then backed away from this position, describing
such use as “unsound in principle.”163 In the 1970s, however, the
Court began to endorse the use of procedural default to bar review of
constitutional violations when a state prisoner failed to adhere to
state procedural rules.164 The result of an inmate’s failure to comply
with these state rules was the “default,” or the federal court’s refusal
to rule on the merits.165 This trend has had staying power. The
Court has grounded the requirement in federalism principles,
prioritizing state courts’ autonomy over determination of federal
questions.166 More generally, the Court deems that “[f]ederal
intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States’ sovereign
power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional rights.”167
The two exceptions to procedural default are narrow in theory and
perhaps narrower in fact. First, petitioners can overcome procedural
default if they show cause for the default and prejudice.168 Second,
petitioners can overcome procedural default if, essentially, they can
show that they are likely factually innocent.169
162. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 301 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(expressing frustration with inmates’ increased access to, and potential abuse of,
post-conviction remedies).
163. Fay, 372 U.S. at 434.
164. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
165. Fay, 372 U.S. at 399.
166. See Stephanie Dest, Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural
Default: An Abstention-Based Interest Analysis, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265, 269–74, 280–
81 (1989) (offering historical and other background on the elevation of state
procedural rules in habeas corpus before arguing that such a transition is a form of
illegitimate jurisdictional abstention); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 518
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that federal court should abstain from
review only after weighing those interests against the interests in favor of federal
review). But see Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1130 (2011) (mentioning explicitly
“this Court’s repeated recognition that federal courts must carefully examine state
procedural requirements to ensure that they do not operate to discriminate against
claims of federal rights”).
167. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 748 (1991) (“These costs are particularly high . . . when a state prisoner,
through a procedural default, prevents adjudication of his constitutional claims in
state court.”).
168. A petitioner can show cause, for example, if he shows an “objective factor
external to the defense” that prevented compliance. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; see
Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90–91; see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (applying
the cause and prejudice analysis and finding “cause” for failure to raise a novel claim
under the state’s procedural rules).
169. The failure to excuse the default must result in a “fundamental miscarriage
of justice.” Engle, 456 U.S. at 135. This exception has been applied to allow an
excuse from procedural default for petitioners who can show that a constitutional
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Many petitioners fall into the procedural default trap, despite their
best efforts.170 Petitioners try, but often fail, to jump through the
required hurdles of state procedure. Following state procedural rules
is even more difficult for unrepresented petitioners, who form the
vast majority of habeas petitioners, as well as for the vast majority of
petitioners who pursue state post-conviction relief.171 In practice, the
number of petitioners who surmount procedural hurdles and
subsequently succeed on their claims is exceedingly low.172 In sum,
procedural default is a lasting and central piece of the Court’s
previous focus on proceduralism.
1. Hypothetical example of two inmates: One who follows procedural rules
and one who does not.
Next, this Article highlights one way in which the Court’s move to
restrictive substantive habeas could change things for a subset of
claims in a way that distorts the goals of procedural default. The
hypothetical pushes the Court’s restrictive substantive habeas to its
logical limits and tests it against existing procedural doctrine. The
hypothetical demonstrates that, given the Court’s current doctrinal
moves, the Court has created a situation where prisoners are arguably
better off by defaulting their claims in some instances instead of
following state procedural rules.
Consider the following example:173 State inmate A, “Alex,” and his
state lawyers follow all of the procedural rules. Alex raises a claim of
violation has likely resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. Murray, 477
U.S. at 496; see House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–37 (2006).
170. See KING ET AL., supra note 14, at 48 (revealing that procedural default is a
basis for 53% of rejections in capital cases and 13% of rejections in non-capital cases).
171. See Feierman, supra note 80, at 369, 371 (noting the use of jailhouse lawyers
to assist with constitutional claims).
172. See KING, ET AL., supra note 14, at 9 (“In 28% of the capital cases and in 42%
of non-capital cases that terminated without either transfer to another district or a
grant of relief, the district court dismissed all claims without reaching the merits.”);
see also Resnik, supra note 39, at 952 n.523 (citing reports that showed that “1.8% [of
petitions filed] resulted in any type of release of the petitioner” and less than 5% of
petitioners obtained relief).
173. This possible habeas conundrum became apparent when I represented an
inmate in federal habeas litigation and the relevant federal claim should have been
raised on direct appeal, but instead it was raised in a post-conviction motion. In that
case, which was not as clear-cut as my hypothetical, the Sixth Circuit upheld the
district court’s grant of habeas relief. Guilmette v. Howes, 577 F. Supp. 2d 904, 906
(E.D. Mich. 2008), aff’d en banc, 624 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Supreme Court itself has only deepened the possible tension highlighted by
the hypothetical in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), and Martinez v. Ryan, 132
S. Ct. 1309 (2012). In both cases, the Court asserted that the failure to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in post-conviction trial court, where that is the
first opportunity to raise that claim, can provide the cause to excuse procedural
default. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1914–15; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. The hypothetical
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ineffective assistance of trial counsel,174 among other claims, in his
direct appeal in state court.175 The state intermediate appellate court
denies the ineffective assistance claim on the merits, finding that
there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice.176 The state’s
highest court denies discretionary review. Now, assume inmate B,
“Brian,” has exactly the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim as
Alex, but Brian and his lawyers fail to raise claims in a timely way
under state rules. Brian fails to raise the ineffectiveness claim in his
direct appeal; instead, he raises it in a state collateral petition.177 The
state post-conviction court determines that Brian did not comply with
the state rule that requires the claim to be litigated on direct appeal.178
example in this Article is based on a claim raised, or not raised, on direct appeal.
Yet, under Martinez and Trevino, the same logic will also hold true for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims that are properly raised in a first state post-conviction petition.
For purposes of the example, the Article assumes that other habeas rules not
mentioned, such as the one-year statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)
(2012), have been satisfied.
174. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (establishing the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
175. Some states permit or require raising ineffective assistance of counsel for
record claims, and even some non-record claims, on direct appeal. Brensike Primus,
supra note 72, at 19, 20 n.114 (discussing procedural requirements that on-the-record
claims of ineffective assistance be raised on direct appeal in Illinois and New York;
procedural rules in Michigan and Oklahoma requiring ineffective assistance to be
raised on direct appeal; and Idaho’s forty-two day time limit to file factual and legal
challenges to the sentence and conviction in capital cases as requiring ineffective
assistance claims to be filed before they can be discovered); see also Bray v. Andrews,
640 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2011) (describing Ohio law as restricting direct appeal
review to evidence within the trial court’s record but allowing the admission of
external evidence through a state post-conviction hearing); Thomas M. Place, Recent
Post Conviction Developments, 81 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 110, 118 (2010) (describing a court
decision rejecting the argument that counsel on direct appeal was not ineffective for
failing to raise a non-record based claim on direct appeal); Joel M. Schumm & James
A. Garrard, Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure, 33 IND. L. REV.
1197, 1229, 1232 (2000) (discussing a state court decision that clarifies when litigants
should raise ineffectiveness on direct appeal—namely, that counsel are permitted to
raise claims on post-conviction if not raised on direct appeal). Compare Keith A.
Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 614 & n.116
(2009) (citing courts that denied raising ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal because the claim was not based on the record), with Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at
1313 (stating that Arizona law requires raising ineffectiveness of trial counsel in a
collateral post-conviction proceeding), and Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 643
(6th Cir. 2009) (detailing that Kentucky law required ineffective assistance of counsel
to be raised via collateral appeal, but forbid relitigation of issues raised and rejected
on direct appeal).
176. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (explaining that, to prove an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must prove first, “that counsel’s performance
was deficient,” and second, “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”).
177. See DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
HANDBOOK WITH FORMS 3 (2013) (describing how state post-conviction motions are
generally available only for claims which were not or could not have been raised at
trial or on direct appeal).
178. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 6.508 (LexisNexis 2007) (stating a court
“may not grant relief” if the defendant “alleges grounds . . . which could have been
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Brian also raises a separate claim of ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel for failing to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim.179
This claim is not defaulted because the post-conviction petition is
Brian’s first opportunity to raise the ineffectiveness of his appellate
counsel.180 For Brian to show ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, like for ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient
performance prejudiced him.181 Appellate counsel is bound to be an
“active advocate” for the inmate and bring significant errors to the
court’s attention.182 The state post-conviction court also denies this
claim. The state appellate courts decline to hear Brian’s case, and,
therefore, the state trial court is the last opinion on his claim.183
2.

Hypothetical examples of two inmates: Are the results skewed in federal court?
Now, fast forward to federal court. Alex and Brian both file a
federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking new trials
based on their trial attorneys’ alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
First, consider Alex’s petition, which is handled by the relatively
straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s restrictive
substantive habeas doctrine.

raised on appeal from the conviction” unless certain exceptions are met); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. § 440.10(2)(c) (McKinney 2005) (denying relief when a defendant
“unjustifiabl[y]” fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, ch.
18, App. R. 3.11 (West 2003) (generally refusing to allow defendant to bring claims
regarding matters not presented at trial); see also Brensike Primus, supra note 72, at
20 n.114 (describing relevant rules in several states); Thomas M. Place, Deferring
Ineffectiveness Claims to Collateral Review: Ensuring Equal Access and a Right to Appointed
Counsel, 98 KY. L.J. 301, 308–12 (2009–2010) (explaining that “[s]tates have moved
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel from direct appeal to the post-conviction
process principally because the basis for the claim may not appear on the record
even where new counsel is appointed or retained for direct appeal”).
179. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395–97 (1985) (construing the right to
effective assistance of counsel on appeal); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536
(1986) (addressing an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim).
180. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452–53 (2000) (finding that a
petitioner who uses a claim, such as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, in
habeas as “cause” to excuse procedural default must either properly raise that claim
in state court or, if raised in federal court, must demonstrate an excuse for
procedural default); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986) (requiring
that a claim be independently raised in state court before using it as “cause” to
excuse procedural default).
181. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 692, 694 (setting the standard for effective
assistance of counsel as requiring performance below the range of competence as
well as a demonstration of prejudice).
182. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393–94.
183. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (“Where there has been
one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders
upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.”).
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Step 1: The federal court can examine the merits of the petition
because Alex and his attorneys properly presented his claims to the
state court. Therefore there is no procedural default.184
Step 2: The federal district court reviews the merits of the case and
assesses whether the state court made an “unreasonable application”
of “clearly established” Supreme Court law.185 This review, under the
Court’s recent line of cases, is “difficult to meet,” and the federal
court must grant the state court “deference and latitude.”186 Even if
the federal court disagrees with the state court’s conclusion and
analysis, the federal court should deny the habeas petition unless the
state court’s decision was “unreasonable.”187 Assume, for purposes of
this example, that the lawyer was ineffective but that, due to the
increasingly strict standard of review, the court denies the claim.188
Under restrictive substantive habeas, the thumb is on the scale to
deny the claim, even if, under de novo review, the federal court
would have found that the claim had merit.
Next, examine what happens to the second inmate, Brian, who
failed to raise his ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal and instead
raised it—too late—in state post-conviction proceedings.
Step 1: The federal court asks the threshold question of whether
the inmate has procedurally defaulted his claim.189 The federal
district court will look at the state court’s determination that Brian
did not comply with state rules that required his ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claim be raised on direct appeal and will find that
Brian has procedurally defaulted this claim.
Step 2: The federal court will then examine whether there is a
permissible exception to applying the procedural default doctrine.190
In this case, Brian will argue that he has shown cause to excuse his
procedural default because of his appellate attorney’s

184. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991) (discussing
procedural default as a bar to federal court review of claims).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
186. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785–86 (2011).
187. See id. at 778 (“AEDPA’s unreasonableness standard is not a test of the
confidence of a federal habeas court in the conclusion it would reach as a de novo
matter. Even a strong case for relief does not make the state court’s contrary
conclusion unreasonable.”).
188. See supra, Part II.C.
189. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law default
prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can
ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”).
190. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (excusing
procedural default when the prisoner can demonstrate cause and actual prejudice or
where denying his claim would result in “a fundamental miscarriage of justice”);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 90–91 (1977).

THOMAS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2014 12:42 PM

1782

[Vol. 63:1749

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

ineffectiveness.191 The federal district court will then review whether
appellate counsel was ineffective to determine whether there is a
reason for the procedural default.192 This is a threshold legal
question governed by procedural default doctrine, not 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
so the district court will make this determination de novo.193 It might
be assumed that, because the state court actually reached the merits
of the appellate counsel claim, the federal court should apply AEDPA
“deference” to the state court’s adjudication of this claim. However,
nothing in the statutory language dictates this application. The
petitioner is not seeking habeas relief on the appellate counsel claim;
rather, he is seeking relief on the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.
Instead, the federal court is engaging in a review of cause and
prejudice to overcome procedural default, a determination that
comes prior to assessing the merits of the petitioner’s claim.194
Therefore, for the purpose of determining whether Brian has shown
cause, the federal court can arguably review the ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel claim de novo.
To show ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner
must demonstrate that his appellate counsel failed to raise a
meritorious claim that would affect the outcome of the appeal.195
Therefore, the federal court must also examine (de novo) the
underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that the
appellate attorney failed to raise.196 The example assumes that trial
counsel was ineffective. Therefore, assume that the federal court
finds that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in a way that

191. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) (holding that ineffective
assistance of counsel can establish cause to excuse procedural default); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (same). The prejudice inquiries under ineffective
assistance of counsel claims and under procedural default essentially track each
other. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (explaining that for a
defendant to challenge a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the
prejudice prong requires a defendant to show that “counsel’s errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”); Wainwright,
433 U.S. at 87, 91 (discussing the prejudice rule laid out in Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 542 (1976), and finding a lack of prejudice due to the other evidence of guilt).
192. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012).
193. Id.
194. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494–96 (requiring both cause and prejudice to be
shown to overcome procedural default).
195. See, e.g., Burton v. Renico, 391 F.3d 764, 783 (6th Cir. 2004) (“In sum, the
failure of Burton’s counsel on direct appeal to raise Burton’s various procedurally
defaulted claims does not rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel necessary to overcome procedural default because none of Burton’s claims
seem meritorious.”).
196. See, e.g., Coleman v. Metrish, 476 F. Supp. 2d 721, 732–33 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
(finding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise an issue on
appeal because that issue “lacked merit” at trial).
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prejudiced the defendant at trial and that appellate counsel’s failure
to raise this claim was constitutionally ineffective.197 This means that
there is both cause and prejudice to overcome a procedural default.198
Step 3: Now that the procedural default doctrine does not bar the
federal court from examining the merits of the petition, the district
court will evaluate Brian’s claims. As the state court did not
“adjudicate” these claims “on the merits,”199 the federal court will
review his claims de novo.200 The outcome here ought to be
predictable based on the federal court’s examination of the exact
same claims for purposes of cause and prejudice. The federal court
will find that Brian has shown ineffective assistance of trial counsel
(and appellate counsel) and will grant conditional habeas relief.
What happened under the application of the procedural default
doctrine and the Court’s new restrictive substantive habeas? In sum,
Brian, who failed to properly present his claims to the state court, was
able to have his petition granted, whereas Alex, who “did everything
right” in state court, had his petition denied due to the standard of
review, especially due to the sharp teeth that the Supreme Court has
recently given to the AEDPA language.201 The more deference the
Court gives to the state court’s adjudication of the substance of
federal constitutional claims, the wider the potential gap. While this
example was possible previously, the Supreme Court’s “super
deference” from Lett, Richter, and other cases exacerbates the
inconsistency.202 This hypothetical, if true, turns the procedural
197. In fact, the likelihood of overcoming procedural default based on ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel is slim. In a 2007 study, procedural default was
overcome in 37 out of 265 non-capital cases, and, in at least some cases, the court
reached the claims merely for judicial economy. KING ET AL., supra note 14, at 48–49.
In capital cases, a procedural default defense was rejected in at least one of 1 of 58
cases, although there is no explanation why the default was excused. Id. at 48.
198. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 (1977) (requiring a state prisoner
to show cause and prejudice to bypass a procedural default); see also Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285–86 (2000) (requiring a defendant demonstrate that
appellate counsel was deficient, first, by showing appellate counsel made objectively
unreasonable choices, and then by demonstrating a reasonable probability that the
absence of a merits brief caused his failure on appeal).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
200. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (explaining that the Court
will “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available
mitigating evidence”).
201. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (stating that “AEDPA
demands more” and that its requirements are purposefully “difficult to meet”).
202. Stone v. Powell provides another early example of the paradox created by
narrowing or eliminating substantive review. In Powell, the Court prohibited habeas
review of Fourth Amendment claims where the state conducted “full and fair
litigation” of the issues. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). A petitioner who properly raises
his Fourth Amendment claim in state trial court will be unable to file a habeas
petition on this claim. Id. A petitioner who did not raise the claim, however, and
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default doctrine, at least in limited circumstances, on its head and
creates perverse incentives for state prisoners. The example is
helpful not because it defines a large class of actual habeas cases—
although it might—but because it exposes the illogic in the Court’s
restrictive version of procedural and substantive habeas.
B. Comity and Federalism: Redux
In its move to restrictive substantive habeas, the Court has made
parallel overtures to what it did while moving to restrict procedural
avenues for prisoners. To the extent that the Court has explained its
rationale for restrictive substantive habeas, the Court has indicated
that it is deferring to the state courts’ substantive decisions and
adhering to principles of comity and federalism. The Court is
valuing state courts’ decision making authority in a federalist system
and the finality of state court convictions.203 The Court may also be
taking cues from a view of habeas corpus history that asserts that the
federal courts had no place reviewing state court substantive decision
making, even if the decisions were wrong.204
This comity and federalism narrative has limits, however. There is
an inherent tension in the Court’s emphasis on deference to the state
courts. Procedural default doctrine calls for the federal courts to
acknowledge and support independent rules of state procedure. The
Court’s restrictive habeas doctrine calls for the federal courts to defer
to state courts’ adjudication of federal constitutional claims. The
above example highlights that, at least in some cases, these perhaps
independently sensible impulses clash. The Court’s narrative does
not give guidance to courts on how to prioritize between deference to
state law procedural rules and state court decisions on questions of
federal law.205 Further, comity and federalism fail to give contour the
appropriate set of cases for habeas review and, possibly, relief.206
asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the failure to raise the Fourth
Amendment claim will be able to enter the federal courthouse door and may
succeed in obtaining relief. See, e.g., Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir.
2001) (noting that “a habeas petitioner may assert a Sixth Amendment claim based
on his counsel’s failure to move for the suppression of evidence that should be
excluded under the Fourth Amendment”).
203. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (citing cases in which the Court upheld procedural
bars to federal court review of state inmates’ constitutional claims).
204. Id. at 786 (“[H]abeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through
appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bator, supra note 9, at 466
(“[S]ubstantive error on the part of a court of competent jurisdiction does not
render a detention ‘illegal’ for purposes of habeas corpus[.]”).
205. For example, one option is to prioritize giving deference to state procedural
rules based on the repeated application of these rules in case after case over giving
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One response to the example of the potential conflict between
proceduralism and restrictive substantive habeas is to assert that the
Court has not gone too far and, instead, that it has not gone far
enough to limit federal review of the substance of habeas petitions.
Another possible response would be to apply the Court’s tightly
construed, deferential AEDPA standard when the Court assesses
questions of federal law for purposes of the procedural default
determination207 or for the merits determination once cause and
prejudice have been found. This type of reading would be contrived
for both approaches because procedural default is an equitable
doctrine not bound by AEDPA.208 To give “deference” on the
procedural default determination contradicts uncontested and
sensible law: the Court has been clear that the question of whether
there is a procedural default is a question of federal law.209 Further,
these formulations would be nonsensical because there is no state
court substantive decision to which the federal courts could defer,
even under the current expansive reading of what is a state court
“adjudicate[ion] on the merits.”210 Further, the lack of a parallel de
novo standard for both the default inquiry and the merits inquiry
could result, at least intellectually, in the finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel for purposes of cause, but the denial of the
never-before decided substantive claim under some case law-created
deference doctrine. This approach, ungrounded in the habeas
statutory scheme or procedural default doctrine, makes little sense.
IV. RECLAIMING SUBSTANTIVE HABEAS
As illustrated above, there may be times when the Court’s newly
energized deference to state substantive determinations undermines
its previous enthusiasm for respecting state procedural rules.
deference to state court determinations of federal law because doing so would
resolve more cases more easily.
206. To the extent the Court articulates a rationale, it only harkens to a footnote
in a concurrence from a 1979 case which adopts the view that habeas is not a
substitute for appellate review but a mechanism to correct “extreme malfunctions” of
the state justice systems. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
207. In other words, the analysis of whether cause and prejudice exist would not
be examined de novo but, instead, with some sort of new “deference.”
208. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–20 (2012) (contrasting equitable
doctrine of procedural default with AEDPA).
209. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (“‘[T]he adequacy of state
procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions,’ . . . is not within the State’s
prerogative finally to decide; rather, adequacy ‘is itself a federal question.’” (quoting
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965)).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (requiring state court “adjudicat[ion] on the
merits” to be an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law).
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Accordingly, Part IV considers what priorities should be given when
the restrictive substantive habeas does not fit with the prior
procedural restrictions. Taking the Court’s emphasis on comity and
federalism as a given, Part IV concludes that federal courts, at least
when pressed to defer to state procedural decisions or state
substantive decisions, should defer on procedural points and re-open
their ability to review decisions of substantive federal law. A number
of reasons support shifting towards substantive review, including
arguments about federal court expertise and the effect on prisoners’
sense of fair play. The Court’s desire to defer to state courts can
focus the scope of review, yet habeas courts can alternatively look to
other values, such as relative institutional capacity and expertise, to
shape habeas doctrine.
Federal court expertise is a value with deep and established roots in
federal habeas doctrine and can give a coherent rationale for a focus
on substantive habeas. Habeas review has, at least in the past, been
justified on grounds of the federal courts’ expertise.211 “[F]ederal
judges have special expertise in the federal issues that regularly arise
in habeas corpus proceeding[s].”212 In other words, federal courts
are more familiar with, and better at determining, questions of
federal law213 and state courts are more familiar with, and better at
determining, questions of state law.214 As Second Circuit Judge Guido
Calabresi forcefully stated, “The intermediate courts of any state have
other things that they must be more concerned with. They are not
experts on federal law and, with great respect to them, they are not
good at it.”215 It may also be true that federal courts are less practiced
211. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 336 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212. Id.
213. Id.; see Brensike Primus, supra note 72, at 17 (describing the majority view
among legal scholars that federal judges are “more expert than their state
counterparts” on federal issues and “more able to apply uniform interpretations of
federal law”).
214. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1197–98 (2005) (suggesting that one benefit of initial state review
is state courts’ greater expertise in state law and procedure).
215. Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1293 n.*, 1304 (2003). But see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519
(1982) (“As the number of prisoners who exhaust all of their federal claims
increases, state courts may become increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward
federal constitutional issues.”). This expertise theory is, of course, one possible
understanding of the pre-AEDPA standard of review for habeas, which allowed the
federal courts to review de novo questions of law and mixed questions of fact and
law. Compare Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) (“It is the district judge’s
duty to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings
independently. The state conclusions of law may not be given binding weight on
habeas. That was settled in Brown v. Allen[.]”), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953)
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and skilled at determining questions of state law.216 And state courts
are less practiced, and skilled, at determining questions of federal
law.217 Although by no means the only or even the dominant theme
in habeas case law, the expertise of federal courts is a consistent strand.
Federal courts are well equipped to examine substantive state court
law and to determine whether it is adequate and independent, but
they are less equipped to examine state procedural rules. For a
federal court to assess a state’s procedural rules, the federal court has
to learn state court rules that could be fortuitously similar to federal
rules or entirely different. For example, to determine whether state
court procedural rules are “adequate” and “independent” requires
not only an understanding of the letter of the law and interpretative
case law, but also more idiosyncratic aspects of the law, such as an
understanding of the “usual” practice of state courts.218
A move to non-restrictive substantive habeas, while maintaining
procedural deference, also has the potential for avoiding disruption
of the state court adjudicative process. If a federal court determines
that, in a given case, it will overrule a state court on a question of
federal substantive law, its decision will upset that one case but is
unlikely to have any ripple effect. On the other hand, a federal
court’s finding that a state court’s procedural rule is not adequate or
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (establishing that federal courts conduct plenary review
on questions of law considered by the state court), with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(requiring state court adjudications to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable
application” of clearly established law).
216. See, e.g., Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 968 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(referring, with disapproval, to the potential that federal courts in habeas review
might “decide the merits of claims using state law, with which the state courts are
likely more familiar”), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1452 (2013); Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts
and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 567
(2006) (expressing frustration with how federal courts must use “scarce resources”
to assessing the adequacy of state procedural rules).
217. Calabresi, supra note 215, at 1304; see also Brensike Primus, supra note 72, at
11 (noting that state courts, faced with overwhelming caseloads and little federal
oversight, have “incentive[s] to cut corners”).
218. To determine whether a state rule is adequate and independent, federal
courts inquire into whether a state court regularly follows the state procedural rule.
See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1991) (determining that a state
procedural default is not an “adequate and independent” state ground barring
federal review unless the rule was “firmly established and regularly followed”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1130
(2011) (“A state ground . . . may be found inadequate when discretion has been
exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial
support in prior state law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James v. Kentucky,
466 U.S. 341, 345–47 (1984) (holding that a state rule requiring a defendant
requesting a particular jury charge to label the request as one for an “instruction[]”
and not an “admonition[]” had not been consistently applied); Rogers v. Alabama,
192 U.S. 226, 230 (1904) (finding a state rule striking a two-page motion to quash an
indictment inadequate because it was prolix).
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independent will affect not only the current case before the federal
court, but potentially all other similarly situated state court cases.219
These procedural decisions are not usually interwoven with the facts
of the specific case; instead, state courts apply them to a variety of
factual circumstances.220
Adopting (or returning to) non-restrictive substantive habeas
would have other expressive benefits that work with, instead of fight
against, the reality of habeas corpus. At present, scores of desperate,
mostly pro se, inmates file Hail Mary habeas petitions. The Court’s
attempts to narrow the avenues to habeas may have deterred some
inmates, but large numbers keep coming.221 It will be interesting to
see whether the move to restrictive substantive habeas will have any
effect on filing numbers in federal court. One real possibility is that
it will not since a tougher standard of substantive review means that it
is less likely that a prisoner’s habeas petition will be granted. Yet, the
chance of a petition being granted before this shift, especially for a
non-death penalty case, was already infinitesimal.222 State inmates
serving long sentences will continue to file habeas petitions even with
a heightened substantive standard, and federal district court judges
will continue to have to review these petitions. Accordingly, to the
219. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 366, 381 (2002) (finding that a rule
requiring that a motion for a continuance be written and accompanied by an
affidavit was an inadequate bar to habeas review where an oral motion satisfied the
rule’s purpose); Hatfield v. Ballard, 878 F. Supp. 2d 633, 654–54 (S.D. W. Va. 2012)
(citing Lee in finding a state procedural doctrine of “invited error” was inadequate to
bar federal review in the case because it was an “exorbitant application” of the rule);
Fong v. Poole, 522 F. Supp. 2d 642, 653, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (relying on Lee in
granting a habeas petition because the prisoner had substantially complied with the
contemporaneous objection rule).
220. See, e.g., Wood v. Milyard, 721 F.3d 1190, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2013) (stating
that while Colorado courts apparently retroactively apply a state procedural rule to
litigants like the petitioner, that application would not be adequate to bar habeas
court consideration of federal claims that did not comply with this rule).
221. See KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 70 (“Between 1970 and 2006, the
number of petitions filed for every [10,000] prisoners plummeted from [500] to less
than 150. From the perspective of federal judges and the states’ attorneys who had
to respond to these petitions, the total number of petitions continued to grow, each
year surpassing the number filed the year before.”).
The tenacity, persistence, and, perhaps, desperation of prisoners—for whom
habeas is the only possible way out from under a long sentence—is seldom discussed
and largely underestimated. Certainly, setting more roadblocks to being considered
will weed out some prisoners’ petitions. This persistence is also seemingly why a shift
to focusing only on innocence in habeas would ultimately prove frustrating to the
courts: if innocence is the hurdle through which petitioners must jump, then habeas
petitioners will assert their innocence. See John H. Blume et al., In Defense of
Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 460
(2011) (arguing that severe limiting the exceptions to noncapital habeas applications
would not produce a reduction in the number of petitions).
222. See KING, ET AL., supra note 14, at 64 tbl.15 (showing courts granted relief of
any kind in only 0.35% of non-capital cases and 12.4% of the time in capital cases).
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extent that the Court wishes to lower the number of petitions within
the system, restrictive substantive habeas is probably not the answer.
To an inmate, a restrictive habeas regime—one in which the
federal court hypothesizes about the state court’s possible reasons for
denial of the federal claim and then finds those made-up reasons
sufficiently sound—is preposterous. As an initial matter, the mental
gymnastics of the Court’s recent cases are incomprehensible to a
number of prisoners.223 Harrington v. Richter and Johnson v. Williams,
in particular, require a level of abstract reasoning that may be beyond
the capacity of many inmates.224 Literally, it looks like the court is just
doing hocus-pocus to deny petitions.
Beyond the mental gymnastics required, non-restrictive habeas
requires the Court to focus on a particular claim, and particular
language in the review of that claim, as well as determine the merits
of the claim. This actual look at the substance of an inmate’s claim,
whether granted or denied, may help promote the inmate’s
perception of the legitimacy of the legal system and the fairness of
the courts that are reviewing his case.225 In essence, a move to nonrestrictive substantive habeas would give unrepresented inmates an
223. See, e.g., ELIZABETH GREENBERG ET AL., LITERACY BEHIND BARS: RESULTS FROM
2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY PRISON SURVEY 13 fig.2-2 (2007),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007473.pdf (showing that, in 2003, 50%
or more of prisoners scored “below basic” or “basic” on all three literacy scales used);
see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 tbl.1 (2003), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf (reporting that, of state prison
inmates, 39.7% had some high school education or less, 28.5% had a General
Educational Development certificate (GED), and 20.5% had a high school diploma).
224. Both cases look beyond the state court’s actual decision and have the federal
court hypothesize post-hoc rationalization of the state court’s decision, only to then
evaluate the reasons that the federal court just imagined. See Johnson v. Williams,
133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094–96 (2013) (“Although Richter itself concerned a state-court
order that did not address any of the defendant’s claims, we see no reason why the
Richter presumption should not also apply when a state-court opinion addresses some
but not all of a defendant’s claims. . . . [F]ederal courts have no authority to impose
mandatory opinion-writing standards on state courts. . . . When a state court rejects a
federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must
presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits[.]” (citation omitted));
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011) (“[R]equiring a statement of
reasons could undercut state practices designed to preserve the integrity of the caselaw tradition. The issuance of summary dispositions in many collateral attack cases
can enable a state judiciary to concentrate its resources on the cases where opinions
are most needed. . . . When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and
the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated
the claim on the merits . . . .”).
225. See, e.g., Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice:
The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 211, 215–16 (2012) (“[P]rocedures are legitimate when they are
neutral, accurate, consistent, trustworthy, and fair—when they provide opportunities
for error correction and for interested parties to be heard.”).
THE
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opportunity to describe what they see as the unjustness of their cases,
instead of feeling as if the federal courts are trying to deprive them of
an opportunity to have their claims heard.226 Of course, moving to a
non-restrictive view of habeas is constrained by the procedural
barriers that inmates must surmount to even enter the federal
courthouse door. Yet, these inmates who navigate the procedural
obstacles can file habeas petitions227 that state the merits of their
claims and tell the stories of their cases. And, while not welcome by
inmates, even denials of the writ must engage with the merits of the
claim and the state court’s opinion. The “unreasonable application”
language can be constraining, but it is not suffocating.
CONCLUSION
After decades of focus on the procedural intricacies of federal
habeas corpus practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently
tightened substantive review of state court decisions. This notable
shift to a restrictive substantive reading of habeas is not costless and
was made without sufficiently noting pre-existing law, approaches and
theories of habeas, and practice. This Article highlights a story—
previously told by the Court and scholars—of federal court expertise
on federal law, which explains a shift to substantive habeas and
describes a sensible approach to when federal courts should defer to
state decision makers if and when procedural and substantive
doctrines clash. In this explanation, the shift from procedural to
substantive habeas conforms to an understanding of what a federal
court can do well (and what it cannot) and fulfills other beneficial
functions. In the end, based on this rationale, the Article finds merit
in the Court’s move to focusing on substantive habeas but also brings
to light flaws in the restrictiveness of the Court’s current doctrine.

226. See Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment, supra note 84, at 350 (outlining
several barriers to relief that can preclude inmates’ claims being addressed on the merits).
227. In practice, it is usually the inmate himself or herself that is filing the
pleading. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 191 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(providing the results of a study that showed that 93% of federal habeas petitions
were filed pro se).

